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THE PARADOX OF A LIFE IN LAW
James R. Elkins*
I. THE PARADOX
What does it mean to say that a life in law is a paradox? A paradox
is a seemingly contradictory statement which is nonetheless true
despite the contradiction. A person or situation is deemed paradoxi-
cal when it has contradictory aspects. The premise of this essay is
that a life in law involves major contradictions which make living
such a life paradoxical.'
This essay is based on the view that there are two seemingly
contradictory ways to orient our life in law. The challenge is to
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University, College of Law; A.B., University
of Kentucky, 1967; J.D., University of Kentucky, 1971; LL.M., Yale University, 1975. This
Article is based in part on a revision of two papers delivered to an informal, noncredit, year-
long seminar conducted by the author at DePaul University College of Law. The author
wishes to thank the participants in the Imagination and Creativity in Lawyering Seminar,,
who provided the intellectual stimulus for the initiation of this work. This essay has bene-
fited immensely from the perceptive criticism and editorial assistance of Lucinda Dumas,
my research assistant at West Virginia, and Dr. Harry West, a personal friend. A grant from
the Hodges Trust for the West Virginia University College of Law made it possible to com-
plete the essay.
1. The theme of this essay-that a life in law is a paradox-parallels Justice Cardozo's
view of law itself. For Cardozo law was the "child of antinomies." B. CARwozo, TAE PARADOXES
OF LEGAL SCIENcE 4 (1928).
Behind the facade of law in modem society Cardozo found:
the ancient mysteries crying out for understanding-rest and motion, the one and the
many, the self and the not-self, freedom and necessity, reality and appearance, the
absolute and the relative. . . . Deep beneath the surface of the legal system, hidden
in the structure of the constituent atoms, are these attractions and repulsions, uniting
and disservicing as in one unending paradox.
Id. at 4-5,7. Indeed the great problems in law involve "[tihe reconciliation of the irreconcila-
ble, the merger of antitheses, the synthesis of opposites. . . ." Id. at 4.
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understand these prototypical world-views and how one's own life
style and work patterns move one to strongly adopt a unidimen-
sional view of the world, and finally to decide whether there is a
means of moving from one orientation to the other as individual and
social needs dictate.
This essay will consider the contradictory elements of a life in
law; locate the paradox in the life of the law student, law teacher,
and lawyer; explore some of the ramifications of a paradoxical life;
and finally suggest a way of viewing such a life.
While the paradoxical nature of our existence as lawyers can be
traced to a number of contradictory aspects in legal education and
lawyering, the paradox at the very core of our lives as students, law
teachers, and lawyers is the reconciliation of the "real" and the
"ideal." Students confront the dichotomy of the real and ideal as
they chart a difficult course in learning law and as they determine
whether a life in law offers opportunity for expression of deeply held
values. Law school is often experienced as a place that limits imagi-
nation and creativity and stifles ideals. Law teachers are frustrated
by students who have "given in" to learning for grades, and yet
teachers often reinforce the belief that personal values and social
ideals are obstacles to learning the law and becoming a skilled law-
yer. Students, in turn, see little utility in innovation or in creative
efforts to improve learning. Both law students and law teachers
seem to be part of a system in which each acts to destroy the efforts
of the other toward achieving his ideal. Students emerge from such
a learning environment only to find themselves in a similar position
in the legal system. The practicing lawyer struggles with real clients
and real legal problems while often seeking an expression of self that
being a legal technician does not allow.
I have chosen the real and the ideal as the polar elements of the
paradox for one who chooses law as a career. The reader will un-
doubtedly find that these terms suggest a variety of possible mean-
ings. The terms beg for a definition: what does the author mean by
"real," by "ideal"? I have chosen not to begin the essay by defining
these terms, but to allow the essay itself to suggest the nature of the
real and the ideal. The precise meaning of that which is real and
that which is ideal can only be given by a reader as he comes to
understand the underlying purpose of the essay and his own life in
law.
This essay explores the paradox of the real and ideal by moving
freely from the descriptive to the biographical. For too long we have
denied the intimate personal connection in the substance of what
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we choose for academic scholarly work. Consequently, this essay is
a description of the paradox; at the same time it seeks to develop a
speculative theoretical framework and to make a personal state-
ment. While the reader will find footnotes which resort to citation
of so-called authorities, the essay is not intended to be viewed as
traditional legal research.
Lest the reader despair that this essay is merely a revelation of
one teacher's neurosis, 2 analysis of the way we dichotomize the
world into the real and the ideal has serious possibilities for interdis-
ciplinary legal research. For example, one could begin by determin-
ing whether a significant number of law students, law teachers, and
lawyers experience the contradiction of the real and the ideal. What
are the effects of this dichotomization on the way we experience the
world? To what extent is our professional identity as lawyers formed
by the real, the practical, in our everyday life? Do our ideals contrib-
ute to the self-image that becomes a part of both personal and
professional identity? In essence, what is the relationship of identity
to the paradox of the real and ideal? What role does legal education
play in creating and resolving the paradox? What particular aspects
of law promote reliance on what we believe to be real or ideal?
Where can we find adequate models for a life in law wtich seeks to
integrate the real and ideal?
The real and the ideal can be seen in particular world-views
which are actually and actively adopted and used by individuals in
law. I have chosen to view the "real" as reflected in an ideal type-
practical man, while the "ideal" is related to the artist.
A. Practical Man
The essence of a practical man's world-view can be simply stated:
an emphasis on simplicity, experience and the traditional values
expressed in work.
A practical man takes the world for granted. He feels little need
to question that which appears to be and even less need to inquire
into that which makes no appearance at all. The practical man is
perfectly content to leave the unknown unexplored. A practical man
finds little reason to question what he does or the way he views the
world. While the practical man has a philosophy, he has no desire
to figure out what it is.
2. See, e.g., C. REICH, THE SORCERER OF BOLIANs REEF (1976).
3. For a historical perspective on the practical man, see E. HoFFER, THE ORDm OF
CHANGE 58-77 (1963).
19791
132 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
The practical man's view of the world is based on experience.
Consequently, the view is highly subjective.4 Only as the practical
man experiences the world is it known and real to him. Husserl asks:
"Is not the life-world as such what we know best, what is always
taken for granted in all human life, always familiar to us in its
typology through experience?" 5
A practical attitude involves one in activity, supported by what
is already known or can be readily learned. A practical life is possi-
ble only when we know certain. materials and tools and can discover
so much of that which is unknown as will allow continued produc-
tive activity.
The knowing of practical man lies in the doing. Action becomes
a mode for knowing. Since the practical man knows only that which
he does, his self-image is closely tied to his work. The close relation-
ship of our orientation toward work and our life-world is suggested
by those who contend that "major 'habits of mind,' approaches to
the world, or in phenomenological terms, attitudes towards every-
4. The'life-world of the practical man is a subjective view of the world as a result of
his devotion to knowing by way of experience. The experience of practical man is undermined
by science-scientists tell us that we "see" only a limited part of the world and that which
we do see and experience is often illusory. The simplified world-view of practical man is
destroyed by the scientific ethic which shows practical man that things in the world are not
as they seem. Science has taught us to distrust our senses. Our senses portray a fictive,
nonexistent world.
The practical men of science have by their studied efforts in pragmatism undermined
what was once a practical view of the world. When the practical man accepts the wonders of
modem science and technology, his practical view of the world is threatened.
Yet the practical man is a man willing to accept science, to give up traditional values
for the practical benefits of technology. This presents a paradox in understanding the practi-
cal man as a scientist and a scientist as a practical man, for it is science which has been the
prime mover in suggesting that our experience of the world is so superficial and incomplete
as to preclude our forming a true picture of the world.
The paradox for practical man is one that he shares with science. Abraham Kaplan tells
us that, "[t]he scientific habit of mind is one dominated by the reality principle, by the
determination to live in the world as it is and not as we might fantasy it." A. KhIAN, THE
CONCEIr OF INQuiny 380 (1974). Yet through science the practical man is urged to imagine
and then accept as reality that which his senses cannot confirm. For example, he must come
to believe that something is moving in the electrical wiring that brings light and that
"images" travel through space to our TV screens. Is it not science that prompts the substitu-
tion of a fantasy for what we can actually experience in our everyday life? Can our future in
a scientific world be anything more than a collective fantasy served up by science? It is in-
deed questionable whether Kaplan does not mislead us in his assertion that scientists would
have us live in the world "as it is." The world "as it is" is a world defined by science. Science
now dominates the human mind. H. SMITH, THE FORGOTrEN TRuTH: THE PRIMORDIAL TRADI-
TION (1976).
5. Husserl, The Life-world and Theoretical Praxis in EXISTENTIA PHENOMENOLOGY AND
PoLmcAL THEORY: A RAmR 3, 6 (H. Jury ed. 1972).
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day life, and specialized attitudes, are extensions of habits of
thought that emerge and are developed in the practice of an occupa-
tion, profession, or craft.
' 6
The practical man seeks to live in the world as it is. He accepts
the existing norms and group practices as necessary conditions of his
life. In the absence of questioning, thinking or reflection, existing
social and cultural practices become absolute constraints on the
choices open to the practical man. Yet obviously, the practical man
thinks about his world and reflects on his own experiences and those
of others he may know. The thought is limited and is incapable of
transforming existing approved forms of action. Practical man is
simply a being in the world. Lacking self-knowledge of the world,
he is unable to gain sufficient distance from his own subjective
experience to use his action for the achievement of ultimate values. 7
B. The Artist
The artist, both in life style and consciousness, is far removed from
the practical man. The artist does not accept the world as it is,
either the way it appears to us or the way we are to live in the world.
The artist seeks to impose a new consciousness on the existing order,
to change things. The emphasis is on a sensual experience of the
world which will satisfy aesthetic sensibilities. The artist is a crea-
tive being. Abraham Maslow defines a creative or self-actualizing
person as one who is "attracted to mystery, to novelty, change, flux,
and finds all of these easy to live with, as a matter of fact these are
6. J. BENSMAN & R. LINFELD, CRAFT AND CONSCIOUSNESS: OCCUPATIONAL TECHNIQUE
AND THE DEvELoPMENT OF WORLD IMAGES 1 (1973).
7. The danger in an extreme practical, unreflective orientation in the world is clearly
shown in the following comment of Paulo Freire:
Unlike men, animals are simply in the world, incapable of objectifying either
themselves or the world. They live a life without time, properly speaking, submerged
in life with no possibility of emerging from it, adjusted and adhering to reality. Men,
on the contrary, who can sever this adherence and transcend mere being in the world,
add to the life which they have the existence which they make. To exist is thus a mode
of life which is proper to the being who is capable of transforming, of producing, of
deciding, of creating, and of communicating himself.
Whereas the being which merely lives is not capable of reflecting upon itself and
knowing itself living in the world, the existent subject reflects upon his life within the
very domain of existence, and questions his relationship with the world. His domain
of existence, is the domain of work, of history, of culture, of values-the domain in
which men experience the dialectic between determinism and freedom.
P. FREIRE, CULTURAL ACTION FOR FREEDOM 51-52 (1972).
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what make life interesting."8 Instead of avoiding the dynamic flux
of modern social life, the creative individual maintains an openness
to the world9 and to the inner life.'"
In the artist we often find an integration of "work" and
"living." The artist avoids the compartmentalization of public (pro-
fessional) and private life so often found in the legal world." When
one's work is linked to a professional life that divorces itself from
"living," the skills dimension of life is split off from the value di-
mension. 2 Abraham Maslow has found that self-actualizing, crea-
8. A. MASLOW, EUPSYCHIAN MANAGEMENT: A JOURNAL 192-93 (1965).
Clark Moustakas has suggested that "[a]s long as habit and routine dictate the pattern
of living new dimensions of the self will not emerge; new interests will not develop." C.
MousTAKAs, LONELINESS AND LovE 39 (1972).
MacKinnon suggests: "[C]reative persons are especially disposed to admit complexity
and even disorder into their preceptions without being made anxious by the resulting
chaos. . . .[T]hey prefer the richness of the disordered to the stark barrenness of the sim-
ple." MacKinnon, The Study of Creative Persons: A Method and Some Results, in CaREATIvIT
AND LEARNING 20, 30 (J. Kagan ed. 1967).
Gerard Egan has noted that:
The qualities of the creative person-fluency, or the. ability to put out a large number
of responses to a situation rather than focusing on just one; flexibility or the ability to
change one's thinking and to change the meaning; interpretation, or use of something;
and originality, or a flair for the unusual, the novel, the farfetched, the remote, the
clever ...
G. EGAN, ENCOUNTER: GROUP PROCESSES FOR INTERPERSONAL GRowTH 98 (1970).
9. The openness of the creative individual requires courage. Rollo May has recently
completed a new book on creativity entitled THE COURAGE TO CREATE (1976). Maslow explains
that the courage for creativity:
is simultaneously a kind of justified trust in one's self and a justified trust in the
goodness of the environment and of the future, to be able to face an unexpected, an
unknown, unstructured situation without any guards or defenses, and with an innocent
faith that one can improvise in the situation.
MAsLOw, supra note 8, at 189.
Creativity involves a playful attitude toward reality and a tolerance for ambiguity. On
the ambiguities in the role of the judge, see Freund, An Analysis of Judicial Reasoning in
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 282, 282-83 (S. Hook ed. 1974). The reality of the law student's world
demands both "playfulness" and a working relationship with ambiguity.
See also M. PECKHAM, MAN'S RAGE FOR CHAOS (1965).
10. The creative person is more likely to have "perceptual openness to experience of the
inner life as well as of the outer environment and culture." MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 28.
Creativity "flows from an internal negotiation between what seems to him intuitively
correct and what the constraining forces of technique, of material, of tradition, of criticism
and of the marketplace require." Goleman, The Fertile Tension Between Discipline and
Impulse, PSYCH. TODAY 53, 53 (Oct. 1976).
11. On the split in the private and professional self, see Stone, Legal Education on the
Couch, 85 HARv. L. REv. 392, 422 (1971).
12. Both work and consumption are increasingly a part of an institutionalized bureau-
cracy. Our work is institutionalized and now standardized. As Ivan Illich has so aptly stated,
the consumer has become "addicted" to standardized goods. I. ILLICH, TOwARnD A HISTORY OF
NEEDS 6 (1978). Even education has become a consumer good. Wendell Berry, the Kentucky
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tive individuals "assimilate their work into the identity, into the
self, i.e., work actually becomes part of the self, part of the individ-
ual's definition of himself. '1
3
One characteristic of the artist is that he lives his art: art is life,
and life is art. In the life which expresses itself through craft, there
is a fusion of private life and professional values. The legal artisan
is a participant in life and the law." The lawyer becomes an artist
when he becomes one with law and life.
Robert Lifton, a Yale psychiatrist, has recently directed atten-
tion to a theme common to all major social institutions: "the quest
for significant work experience, both in immediate involvement and
in a sense of the work's contribution to the continuing human enter-
prise."' 5 Law students and young lawyers share with others the con-
temporary quest for self-realization through humanistic work. By
"self-realization," I mean the sense of freeing oneself from the
meaningless automated work of an industrial bureaucratic society
and engaging in work which is socially responsible and personally
fulfilling.16 The focus is on the reinstallation of personal values 7 in
work and achieving a sense of commitment in a world increasingly
poet, novelist, essayist and environmentalist argues that "a practical education has the
nature of a commodity to be exchanged for position, status, wealth .... W. BERRY, THE
UNSETTLING OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND AGRICULTURE 157 (1977).
13. MAsLow, supra note 8, at 1.
14. Fortas, Thurman Arnold and the Theatre of the Law, 79 YALE L. J. 988 (1970).
15. R. LIFTON, THE LIFE OF THE SELF 142 (1972).
16. See generally C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMEuCA (1970). The personal fulfillment
from work is related to the psychological needs of the individual and the ability of a profession
or job to satisfy those needs. See Teete, Francia & Strawser, A Look at Lawyers' Need
Satisfaction, 57 A.B.A.J. 1193 (1971); T. SHAFFER, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A
NuTSHELL 194-200 (1976).
Paul Freund has succinctly described the role of the law in our lives:
[Tihe processes of law - the procedures and ways of thought of lawyers and judges
- may contribute . . . generally to our thinking [and] may help us to live with
uncertainty and ambiguity, may teach us to cope with the great antinomies of our
aspirations; liberty and order; privacy and knowledge; stability and change; security
and responsibility.
P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE at v (1968).
On psychological need theories, see THE COURSE OF HUMAN LIFE 92-101 (C. Buhler & F.
Massarik ed. 1968); A. MASLOw, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 63-154 (1954); M. ROKEACH,
THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND (1960); W. C. ScHtnz, FIROA: TRRE DiENSIONAL THEORY OF
INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR 13-56 (1958).
17. Values come from a deeper and more organic level of experience than the
rational. They are rooted in irrational experience as well as rational; they are both on
unconscious as well as conscious levels. . . .Values are feeling-charged guides around
which the person's devotion crystallizes. Thus, they have their source in the organic
being of the individual and in his interpersonal relationships in his community.
May, Values, Myths, and Symbols, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 703 (1975).
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devoid of both.'8
Finally, the artist is a person of ideals-"the first art of every
artist is to choose the right ideals."9 The lawyer as artist can be
envisioned as a seeker after the ideal of justice, much like the artist's
concern for beauty.2 Karl Llewellyn has argued that law, in addi-
tion to the abstract ideal of justice, has a kind of functional beauty.
For example, legal cases are said by Llewellyn to be beautiful when
"they drive to a point; they drive to technical accuracy, to justice
in the case at hand, to right guidance for the future."'" Legal artistry
is concerned with coupling the passion of our ideals and the func-
tional beauty of law to human problems.
II. THE STUDENT
The ascension to the priesthood of law has a way of engendering
idealism. 22 To many, law is merely a vehicle to achieve a higher
18. "Lawyers regard themselves as socially responsible pursuers of universal verities,
concerned with value-laden concepts. The myth is often expressed in the proposition that
they are 'generalists' in an age of 'specialists.'" Tapp, Psychology and the Law: The
Dilemma, PSYCH. TODAY 16, 20 (Feb. 1969).
Stuart Scheingold has labeled this notion as the "myth of the lawyer-generalist." He
notes that it is a "conceit which converts the accidental fact that the lawyer is an available
social handyman, ready to take on a wide variety of complex assignments, into a basis for
supposing he has a competence to deal with ever more complex phenomena." S. SCHEINGOLD,
THE Po iTics OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 161 (1974) (quoting
Goldstein, The Unfilled Promise of Legal Education in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA 161-63
(G. Hazzard, Jr., ed. 1968)).
"[Tihe basic challenge to legal education is to effect an accommodation between gener-
alized and specialized training while maintaining an awareness of and ability to respond to
actual and projected changes in the social structure and in the roles of the attorney." Speidel,
A Matter of Mission, 54 VA. L. REv. 606, 611 (1968).
19. D. MASON, ARTISTIC IDEALS 2 (1927).
20. See A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE 169 (1971).
21. Llewellyn, On the Good, The True, The Beautiful in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 224,
229-30 (1942).
22. Harry Kalven has noted that "aspirations to service, skill, loyalty, fiduciary trust,
and courage and independence in defense of the unpopular are traditional aspects of lawyer-
ing which elevate the practice of law to profession status." Kalven, Tradition in Law, in THE
GREAT IDEAS TODAY 23, 26 (1974).
A somewhat different description of the "ideal" in law has been provided by Roscoe
Pound.
Ideal gets its name from a Greek word meaning picture. An ideal of a thing is a picture
of it to which we fit our conception of it as we think it is or ought to be. The ideals of
the social order, however, which become authoritative guides to determination of con-
troversies and ordering of conduct, are not photographs or photographically retouched
drawings of the social order of the time and place. They are largely pictures of a social
order of the past, drawn to it at its best, undergoing retouching as to details in order
to fit exigencies of the present. Ideals of law and ideals of principles and rules of law,
are pictures made to conform to an ethical-philosophical juristic picture of the legal
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social status and financial well-being. But more importantly, con-
sider how law provides the opportunity to achieve a distinct position
in life; how the idealism in law creates the image of the lawyer as
fighter, problem-solver, helper. These images become part of the
student's process of defining self, of distinguishing himself from the
herd. The student is aided in this definitional process by gaining
access to an esoteric body of knowledge inaccessible to the layman
and by acquiring a special technical language.?
As a student, I first experienced disquietude over the excessive
emphasis on the practical aspects of lawyering and the absence of
concern for the ideals which I sought to express through a life in law.
Student veneration of the rules, with encouragement from a respect-
able number of law teachers, kept our focus on the "real world" of
lawyering. Many of my teachers taught as if the rules of cases re-
flected something called law and that bly knowing, finding, and
applying rules, one could be happy in the practice of law.24 Some of
my teachers failed to move beyond the "given" rule (if a rule can
ever be said to be given) to ask the "why" and the "how" of the rule.
Could they have been afraid to ask whether the rule was functional
or served to further human values in society? Here again, there were
teachers to influence our lives, to encourage an escape from the
realism of rules as "given." The conflict of the real and the ideal
became a part of our lives.25
order, intended to guide judges and legislators and administrative agencies toward
making the means afforded by the legal order achieve its postulated ends.
R. POUND, LAw FINDING THROUGH ExPmINcE AND REASON 7 (1960).
A more somber view is taken by jurisprudential scholar Morris Cohen who suggests that:
[ildealists are those who are so impressed with the ideal order, which visible things
only partly embody, that they are charged with neglecting the poor brute facts. The
realists are so impressed with the hard actual facts, especially the unpleasant ones,
that they are charged with neglecting the possibilities of change or improvement inher-
ent in things.
M. ConEN, LAw AND WE SOCIAL ORDER: EssAYs IN LEGAL PHmosopHy 248 (1967).
23. The definitional process outlined here follows closely the sociological view of the
concept of profession. See Elkins, Book Review, 30 VAND. L. REv. 923, 926-27 (1977).
24. I have often thought the phrase "practice law" to be imbued with more meaning
than one who uses it intends. Why is it that we say that one "practices" law (or medicine,
although of less frequent usage) and do not say that a minister or priest "practices" religion?
25. The conflict is both internal to the particular student and external in the deep gulf
created between student and teacher. Andrew Watson explains the psychological aspects of
the conflict:
[Tihe faculty's psychological bias, both conscious and unconscious tends to create
immediately a split in the student's orientation. If he is to become a top-notch student
and identify himself with the professor, he will tend automatically to avoid the mun-
dane problems of law practice. He will deal with law primarily as a series of intellectual
abstractions that permit him to avoid unpleasant emotions and result in a barrier
1979]
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My colleagues and I expended an inordinate amount of time
and energy in the effort to get at the paradox of the real and the
ideal. By "get at," I mean resolve the paradox in the short run, as
in deciding which courses we would take and whether we should
spend scarce free time in following the tangents which seemed so
enticing and yet were so peripheral to the "real" thing which we
were about.
The paradox seemed sometimes distant and at other times of
immediate concern: What should I be getting out of law school to
be a "good" student? What is a "good" lawyer? Is being a "good"
student directly related to being a "good" lawyer? If so, does that
mean that half of the class will be "good" lawyers and the other
half not so "good"? How can I enter the professional world of the
lawyer and maintain a sense of who I am as a person? Is it possible
or desirable to keep the law school world and the world outside of
law school compartmentalized?
What do these people we call law professors have to do with this
paradox in my life? Can we listen to them, believe them, model our
lives after theirs? Why are they teaching instead of "practicing
law"? If we are preparing for entry into the real world, shouldn't we
be taught by "real" lawyers? How can one choose between those
teachers who talk like "real" lawyers and those who make an effort
not to? What about those who warn that an unquestioning accep-
tance of the dictates of the "real" world destroys the imagination
and blunts our creativity?
Students often become bored, passive, cynical, and leave law
school with the belief that legal education has failed to prepare
them for the real world of lawyering. As a result, many law school
graduates "go into legal practice with their ideals buried, their prin-
ciples forgotten and their inspiration stifled. '21 Further inquiry
between himself and all truly professional operations. On the other hand, if a student
retains concern with the "people" part of law practice (which is the area where all
professional questions lie), then he must resist identification with the professor. He will
need to depreciate the importance of the intellectual tasks placed before him and will
often develop serious goal conflicts as he studies law. I have encountered innumerable
examples of this in talks with students and lawyers in groups and individually during
recent years. This schism can be so severe as to force students to drop out of law school,
and those who leave are not necessarily of poor intellectual or psychological caliber.
They merely lack the psychological capacity to resolve the serious conflicts that are
created or supported by the process of legal education.
Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 1, 12 (1963).
26. Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the Application of Hu-
manistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 514, 539 (1978).
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must be made into this state of affairs.
First year law students face the unsettling prospect of three
years of legal study and a saturated employment market. Many
students have struggled to gain admission and once enrolled are
faced with financial pressures which are forcing larger numbers of
students to work and those students already working to increase
their work load. It is not surprising, then, to find students today
concerned not with the "ultimate," but frustrated and fighting for
survival. To survive is to obtain a law degree and pass a bar exami-
nation, mere stops along the way. Law school is simply a place to
put in time, and there are some who avoid even that minimal re-
quirement. Many law students today have little time for subjects or
instructors who are not attuned to the student's work world.2
Today's pragmaticism and concern for "relevance" should be
distinguished from the relevance in legal education demanded by
the activist student in the late 1960's and early 1970's.2 Relevance
then expressed concern for social responsibility of law and lawyer
and the role of legal education in promoting a new ethic. Today
relevance means little more than an illusory relationship between
teaching material, course coverage, and the work the student ex-
pects to perform after graduation. The fear of today's law student
is that he will join a law firm and be asked to research a client
problem involving a "secured interest," not having had a course in
the subject in law school.
Therefore, there is renewed student concern for practical skills.
Students are increasingly pragmatically oriented and expect to
learn "how to do it" as opposed to learning the theoretical structure
and philosophy underlying legal rules.29 A rejection of theory and a
27. See Kelso, In the Shadow of the Bar Examiner, Can True Lawyering Be Taught?,
2 LEARNING AND THE LAW 38 (Winter 1976). The pragmatist bent of today's law student has
been related to anti-intellectualism in legal education. See Allen, The Prospects of University
Law Teaching, 63 A.B.A.J. 346 (1977).
28. Compare Stevens, Aging Mistress: The Law School in America, 2 CHANGE 32 (1970)
and F. MARKS, K. LESWING & B. FoRTrNsKY, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrY (1972).
29. One of the most scathing attacks on the how-to-do-it approach to legal education
was delivered by Robert Hutchins. See Hutchins, The University Law School, in THE LAw
SCHOOL OF ToMORRow 5 (1968). Hutchins declares that "[t]he best practical education is a
theoretical one" and declares "war" on the how-to-do-it law school. Id. at 15. Hutchins
regards the law as a "great intellectual discipline." He argues that:
[tio have the university and the law school dedicated to training technicians is so far
from the potentialities of either as to be a scandal, and too flagrant to continue.
The responsibilities and opportunities of the university and the law school are now
greater than ever. Society needs centers of independent thought and criticism as never
before. The law faces new problems that must be solved if civilization is to survive.
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lack of concern for the subtle nuances of the style, art, and craft of
lawyering alienate the students from both law and law teachers.
Students are ever willing to see theory and practice as polar
opposites, dismissing the possibility of each subsuming the other.
How often do we hear the question: "Will what you are teaching
help me survive the bar examination and the critical scrutiny of
recruiting law firms?" There is an obsession with pragmatic skills
which produce a "street-wise" (court-wise) lawyer following gradua-
tion. "Players in this game have little time for rhapsodies about the
beauty of learning; their interest is in getting the ticket punched in
the shortest time possible and moving on.
'3
Getting a career ticket punched is the work of a practical man.
With an eye to the real world of lawyering one can guard against
illusions of grand possibilities in the world. The practical man suf-
fers from an illusion that he engages the world only through practice
and that theory and ideals are of little value. With the denounce-
ment of theory comes the masking of ideals. Listen to the voice of
the practical man in law school: "I want courses which tell me what
the law is so that I can use it when I get out into legal practice.
Courses should be more practical. Teachers should spend less time
talking about theory and more time showing students how to draft
documents, file papers, and deal with the real problems which I will
face in legal practice. I like courses which help me become a compe-
tent lawyer."
Robert Pirsig in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance
The university is the place where wisdom can be generated. The law needs that wisdom
and must contribute to it. Other civilizations have fallen because of the barbarians
without. That may happen to us. But it seems more likely that we may fall prey to
the barbarians within, from which the university and the law might save us.
Id. at 17.
Robert Redmount, a longtime student of legal education, adds:
Legal education does not serve the lawyer who is consulted on a variety of personal,
social, and institutional problems nearly as well as it serves the lawyer who is ap-
pointed to operate the traditional mechanism of authority of law. The need is for
excellence in delving into and ordering the properties of experience, as well as excel-
lence in defining and advocating some of the properties of authority that guide end
results.
Redmount, Humanistic Law through Legal Education, 1 CONN. L. Rlv. 201, 215 (1968).
Many in legal education will welcome the new pragmatism, the concerns of which permit
legal educators and students to get on with being lawyers as opposed to social critics. Thus,
we will undoubtedly see a strong coalition of survival-oriented law students and a faculty
component which has never given up rule-structured legalism as its raison d'6tre.
30. Costello, Another Visit to the Man Divided: A Justification for the Law Teacher's
Schizophrenia, 27 J. LEGAL EDuc. 390, 401 (1975). Costello notes that this factor may explain
the "sea of apathy" in the classroom. Id. For a somewhat different view of the law student in
1965, see Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L. J. 1402 (1965).
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has described this as a classical view of the world.31 It is a view which
is concerned with how to fix things, how to solve practical problems.
Again listen to the voice of the student: "Look here. Clients will be
coming into my office with all kinds of problems. They want an-
swers, not theories. You don't get paid by a client for the theories
you know. My clients will want to believe that I know the law and
can suggest an answer to their problem. I've got to have the legal
tools which will allow me to serve my clients."
A phenomenologist 32 would ask: Who is the "practical realist"
student? When does this student adopt this orientation? Does this
student bring this attitude to law school, or develop it as a reaction
to law school? What are the other features of this student's world-
view? Is the student's practical orientation at the "center" of the
world-view? What are the psychic and social bases for the pragma-
tist view? How does a student with this orientation experience law
school? What effect does this orientation have on the law school
learning environment? In essence, who are these practically-
oriented students, and how does their pragmatism affect their world
and mind?
Legal educators forget that we present to students the possibil-
ity that they will fail to meet required standards, and many of them
accept the real possibility of failure. Before he can direct any effort
toward the ideals that he hopes to express in a life in law, the
student must become convinced of his ability to survive. Abraham
Maslow has argued persuasively that our basic needs must be met
before higher ideals can be pursued.3
I have been looking at the ideal as if it were something that the
student was moving toward, an attainment which could be envi-
sioned through "reality work." What, we ask, is real about our
ideals? My first reaction is to say that most of us have them; others
would say that we all do. There is a sense that the ideal is real
because it belongs to us; that is, we possess it. Even if we deny the
ideal an active role in our life, it is still there. It doesn't go away
31. R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOToRcYcLE MAINTENANCE (1974). See also Bodenhei-
mer, Classicism and Romanticism in the Law, 15 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1968); Shklar,
Decisionism, in NoMus VII: RATIONAL DECISION 3, 7 (C. Friedrich ed. 1964) ("Lawyers are not
romantic as a rule.")
32. A phenomenologist is a philosopher who would turn away from the abstraction of
theory and hypothesis and "turn toward their concrete referents in experience, i.e., to the
uncensored phenomena." H. SPEIGELBERG, DOING PHENOMENOLOGY: ESSAYS ON AND IN
PHENOMENOLOGY 58 (1975).
33. See A. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BmNG (2d ed. 1968); A. MASLOW, MOIVA-
TION AND PERSONALrrY (2d ed. 1968).
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simply because it isn't acted on or acted out. It is not uncommon
to find the ideal submerged, perhaps distorted or even denied at the
conscious level. Yet with a little archaeological work the ideal can
be exhumed. Ideals are astonishingly resistant.
We can also experience directly the ideal in the real. There are
those who feel "lucky" and "fortunate" in the lives they live. They
view their life as a dream. They experience a realization of their
ideal-being a thoughtful disciplined student.
Whatever the ideals that accompany the student to law school,
the initial task is simply to learn how to learn law. Law teaching is
substantially different from most undergraduate teaching. It re-
quires a major effort for students to learn how to do basic things,
such as briefing cases and taking final examinations. Admittedly
learning how to learn is a preeminent concern only of first year law
students; yet even second and third year students must deal with
the anxiety that comes from dealing with unknown teachers and a
new approach to yet another complex area of law.
Finally, the "reality work" of the law student entails the mas-
tery of numerous fields of substantive law, the ability to do legal
research, draft legal documents, and attain skills in trial and appel-
late advocacy. We indeed ask a great deal of law students. The law
student is deeply enmeshed in the "reality work" of becoming a
lawyer.
To be a lawyer is to be able to perform the role of lawyer by
pursuing legal strategies for solving a particular type of human
problem. As Karl Llewellyn has observed, "any man who proposes
to practice a liberal art [like law] must be technically compe-
tent." "' Clearly one must learn the method of law, the major outlines
of the substance of law, and the traditional concerns and values of
those who live a life in law. The value of this "reality work" is
unquestioned. The problem lies in the way that the reality work of
the student comes to obscure the ideals that he had on entering law
school.
Rather than exacerbating student anxieties about employment
and bar examination results, legal educators should face the prob-
lem. Given an awareness of the problem on the part of law school
administrators, faculty and students, we can proceed to structure a
legal and academic environment which produces competent and
skilled lawyers and reduces the anxieties of the student. This goal
34. K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 380 (1962) (empha-
sis in original).
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should not, however, obscure the tragedy of a legal education which
successfully indoctrinates students into "thinking like a lawyer" but
stifles idealism, social consciousness and creativity.
Benjamin Cardozo once commented in a lecture to Yale law
students:
You think perhaps of philosophy as dwelling in the clouds. I hope you may
see that she is able to descend to earth. You think that in stopping to pay
court to her, when you should be hastening forward on your journey, you are
loitering in bypaths and wasting precious hours. I hope you may share my
faith that you are on the highway to the goal. Here you will find the key for
the unlocking of bolts and combinations that shall never be pried open by
clumsier or grosser tools. You think there is nothing practical in a theory that
is concerned with ultimate conceptions. That is true perhaps while you are
doing the journeyman's work of your profession. You may find in the end...
that instead of its being true that the study of the ultimate is profitless, there
is little that is profitable in the study of anything else.
Ore ultimate concern for the law student lies in the "identity
work" which law school permits and requires.37 The work of forging
a coherent identity is not limited to the period of adolescence,3 8 but
continues as one seeks an image of self which "provide[s] a coher-
ence of ideas and ideals." 39 My observation of and discussions with
law students convince me that this search is nowhere more evident
than in law school.4" In the search for identity, the student, with
35. B. CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw 23 (1924).
"[Tihe most important element of professional education is theory, the ability to relate
specific data to a larger universe of thought; the art of seeing the general in the particular."
Freund, Dedication Address: The Mission of the Law School, 9 UTAH L. REv. 45, 46 (1964).
36. The concepts of "identity work" and "reality work" are adopted from S. COHEN
& L. TAYLOR, ESCAPE ATrEm~r 20 (Pelican Books 1978).
37. The relationship of this "identity work" to the artist's need to create cannot be fully
developed in this essay. Erich Neuman, a follower of Carl Jung, suggests that
The creative man . . . is stigmatized by his failure to abandon the self's directive
toward wholeness in order to adapt himself to the reality of the environment and its
dominant values. The creative man, like the hero of myth, stands in conflict with the
world of the fathers, i.e., the dominant values, because in him the archetypal world
and the self that directs it are such overpowering, living, direct experiences that they
cannot be repressed. The normal individual is released from his heroic mission by his
institutional education toward identification with the father archetype, and so be-
comes a well-adjusted member of his patriarchally directed group. In the creative man,
however, with his predominant mother archetype, the uncertain, wavering ego must
itself take the exemplary, archetypal way of the hero; must slay the father, dethrone
the conventional world of the traditional canon, and seek an unknown directing au-
thority, namely, the self that is so hard to experience, the unknown Heavenly Father.
E. NEUMAN, ART AND THE CRaFTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 185 (1959).
38. See Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HAIV. L. REV. 392, 400 (1971).
39. E. EmKSON, Toys AND REASONS 107 (1977).
40. This observation is not to suggest that the search may not continue throughout one's
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guidance, sees that an identity is rooted in one's values.
Student identity and valued ideals are a part of a larger matrix.
The law student enters law school with expectations, goals and im-
ages in addition to defined intellectual capabilities and work pat-
terns. These are the prima materia which will be subjected to the
operations necessary to produce a professional lawyer. One way to
understand what happens during legal education is by analogy to
the work of the alchemist. Historically, the alchemist was viewed as
a prescientific forerunner of the modern day chemist. Today we
know that the alchemist sought not only a change in the base metals
but was concerned with the transformation of his own consciousness
as he undertook the work. Law schools are devoted to law not only
as a body of knowledge and skills, but also as a way of viewing the
world. Law teachers openly avow to teach their students to "think
like lawyers" and in so doing become alchemists of the soul. Law
teachers are contemporary alchemists: the success of their work lies
in their artistry, for the only true claimant to modern alchemy is the
artist."
While it is agreed that law students change during the course
of legal education, the question concerns the extent of that change
and whether it rises to the level of a change in consciousness. I would
argue that the transformation is a potentially deep one. The depth
and breadth of change has not been fully explored. The methods for
analyzing these changes are at present largely unknown. One possi-
bility would be to look at the changing concept of self and the
relationship of parts of the self. In particular, there is a need to
examine the emergence of an identity as a professional; that is,
when and to what extent does a professional self begin to emerge?42
The law student's developmental change during his socializa-
tion into the legal profession could be viewed from the perspective
of ego-development, attainment of ego-ideals, levels of self-
life. It has been suggested that
seeking is a lifetime quest. That is, as long as one exists one must be concerned with
the problem of what it means to be, and in concerning one's self with what it means
to be in the fullest and most significant manner, one eventually gets probed to one's
ultimate values, one's world-view.
J. RoYcE, THE ENCAPSULATED MAN 124 (1964). As Clark Moustakas has so aptly stated: "The
awareness of one's true place in life cannot be hurried or forced." MouSTAKAS, supra note 8
at 4.
41. This insight comes from Professor John Batt at the College of Law, University of
Kentucky.
42. See generally Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64
VA. L. REv. 735 (1978).
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awareness and self-actualization, the need for expression of creativ-
ity, and finally as a search for meaning.
Another way to approach the change in the law student is to
view it as a resolution of the conflict in vocational and idealistic
demands. I have referred to this conflict as the paradox of the real
and the ideal. The polarity expressed in this paradox can be ex-
pressed in a number of meaningful ways, all of which are clearly
evident in legal education:
practice theory
objective subjective
the present the future
doing learning
knowing how knowing about
work play
student teacher
Finally, the law student's development can be viewed in the context
of the student's basic orientation to learning and the way the stu-
dent's view of learning is worked out in the learning environment.
Here the student's expectations of how law will be taught become
as important as his image of what law is. Expectations as to teach-
ing methods and the images that the student has of the "good"
teacher are primary student inputs into the student-teacher rela-
tionship.
Can the law student hspire to anything other than "reality
work," the work which has as its purpose the training for profes-
sional competence? Is it possible to attain identity as a lawyer and
still satisfy creative needs?
Legal education certainly meets one of the fundamental needs
of the creative person, that is, the development of a reservoir of
fundamental knowledge and concepts. Perhaps some fantasize and
live with the hope that a leap of faith will take us beyond the
drudgery of "basics." We should, however, be careful to note that
"[t]ransformations of old notions require a rich set of concepts and
experiences to be transformed. A rich idea can hardly be born if
there is no rich medium in which it can grow.
'4 3
There are, however, institutional impediments to recognition of
creativity as a legitimate concern within legal education. Creativity
is not a factor in selecting law students; the selection process re-
43. Kagan, Introduction, Creativity and Learning vii, viii (J. Kagan ed. 1968).
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wards an intellectual cognitive style that emphasizes analytical and
language faculties. A cursory review of the literature on creativity
shows that it is largely independent of intelligence and analytical
abilities. The present criteria for law school admission undoubtedly
insure that students who foster creative potentials have less likeli-
hood of being accepted into law school.
The personality of individuals attracted to law school may also
impede teaching approaches which emphasize creativity. Law stu-
dents display an unusually high need for order and security in their
lives, which is reflected in their demands and expectations of the
educational process.44 Order and security emanate from socially
sanctioned traditional values. The very essence of tradition is its
static nature. Tradition permits one to know the world through an
unchallenged consensus-reality and to play a well-defined role.
Adherence to custom and a fear of the unknown are major obstacles
to creativity. 5
Law schools do not claim to produce lawyer-artists, nor should
any school be expected to do so. The artist cannot be mass-produced
by an educational system; rather legal instruction should be viewed
as developing a program of professionally monitored self-
education."
While a program for mass-produced lawyer-artists is not possi-
ble, this should not cause us to overlook the fact that we are all
artists in that we use fantasy and daydreams to help navigate the
real world. The fantasies and daydreams range from erotic inter-
44. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal
Education, 37 U. CN. L. REV. 93, 101 (1968).
45. See SHAFFER, supra note 16, at 279-93 (1976).
It takes courage to be a creative artist lawyer.
It is the courage to be oneself in the fullest sense, to grow in great measure into the
person one is capable of becoming, developing one's abilities and actualizing one's self
. . . [Tihe creative person is not preoccupied with the impression he makes on others,
and is not overly concerned with their opinion of him, he is freer than most to be
himself.
MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 27.
[Clasting loose the ties of security requires courage and understanding. It requires
some courage to move alone often counter to popular prepossessions, and toward uncer-
tainties. And to move free of the established requires the understanding that the
established is not absolute, but is only the instrumentality of life.
THE CREATIVE PROCESS (B. Ghiselin ed.) 19 (1952).
46. See Fuller, What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers, 1 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 109, 200 (1948) arguing that the task of the law school is to start the student
"on a program of self-education and to give him the fundamental insights and ways of thought
that will enable him to draw the maximum profit from his later education in the school of
experience."
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ludes with neighbors to dreams of ambitious careers, to attainment
of significant positions or power and a happy secure life. Neither
science nor psychology has offered adequate theories about the
channeling of everyday fantasies into a work of art-or an artful life.
The law student is not being urged to take flight from the
reality of legal education and the legal profession but to ground
himself in that reality, to bury roots in that reality, so that imagina-
tion can spring from fertile soil.
II. THE TEACHER
The tension in the paradox of the real and the ideal is carried
from the student to the law teacher. Student and teacher deal with
the same paradox from different perspectives. Student and teacher
maintain a symbiotic relationship, each struggling with the shared
paradox from his separate world. In this section we will observe the
rhythmic ballet of student and teacher.
The teacher-student relationship is one of the prominent fea-
tures of a legal education which tempers the ideals of the entering
student, hints at the real world of lawyering and fashions the visions
that law students take with them into the legal world. It seems
* appropriate to inquire into the work of law professors and the images
which they have of this work, and of their life, both in and out of
the classroom. The ultimate question is whether the law professor
is a true craftsman and artist or merely a peddler of a stagnant body
of legal rules and a purveyor of information on how to use those
rules.
There are a host of questions which present themselves as can-
didates for attention in our effort to explore the paradox of the real
and the ideal in the life of the law teacher. What kind of world does
the law teacher live in? How does the teacher see the world? How
does this view of the world affect what goes on in the law school
classroom? What kind of educational philosophy does the teacher
have?47 To what extent is this educational philosophy based upon a
belief that law teaching is different from teaching in other liberal
arts? To what extent are the teacher's educational philosophy and
special views about law teaching actually implemented in the
classroom? To what extent does the teacher profess to have no edu-
cational philosophy, and how does this view affect teaching?
47. Every teacher has a philosophy of education. It may be highly articulated. More
often, it will be largely unconscious or unexamined. McDowell, The Dilemma of a (Law)
Teacher, 52 B. U. L. REV. 247 (1972).
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What does it mean to be a law teacher? What are the motiva-
tions for a law graduate to enter teaching? How have the experiences
of the law teacher, prior to teaching, affected his view of teaching
and the meaning which is ascribed to it? What is deemed to be the
appropriate role (roles) for the law teacher?
Law teachers have been characterized as "prima donnas"48 and
as teachers of problem-solving who have not solved their own prob-
lems.49 Professor Bergin, ten years ago, described the law teacher as
a man divided against himself. 0 In the view of some, the law
teacher's schizophrenia is an occupational hazard without hope of
cure.
5'
The schizophrenia of the law teacher is rooted in the paradox
of the real and the ideal. This schizophrenia has been succinctly
described as a philosophy of education which exists on two levels.
There is
a perception of what the reality of education is, and a set of ideals or values
of what it ought to be. Like the ideal, the perception of reality is also an
abstraction or a concept, since the human mind never completely mirrors the
real world. It is easy to confuse the two conceptual levels. Not only will a
person's ideals color his view of reality, but his notions of what is will ob-
viously flavor his ideals of what ought to be. The more unexamined an educa-
tional philosophy is, the more the two levels tend to merge. The danger then
is that the teacher will accept his perception of reality as the ideal of educa-
tion, or vice versa, and lose the capacity to examine his system critically.'
The law teacher's emphasis on the real or the ideal raises a question
which goes to the essence of a life as teacher: does his work have any
significance? The question is somewhat ambiguous as it does not
suggest for whom teaching should be significant. One aspect of
teaching is that the teacher's work has meaning not only for himself
as a teacher, but also for the student who seeks to learn from his
work. The work of the teacher is unique in that it is carried out in a
"shared" environment. Students share the teacher's work and in
doing so permit its existence.
To ask the question "what does it mean to teach?" we must
consider what it means to be a student. Again, teaching and learn-
ing - teacher and student - are part of a symbiotic relationship,
48. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS, AND PEOPLE 37 (1977).
49. Costello, supra note 30, at 407.
50. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REv. 637
(1968).
51. Costello, supra note 30, at 391.
52. McDowell, supra note 47, at 247 (emphasis in original).
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a relationship honored more often in ignorance than enlightenment.
The first perception of reality for the law teacher, a recognition
of what is, must begin with the law student. Law students constitute
the real world of the law teacher. It is impossible to consider the life
of the teacher apart from the demands that law students make on
the law school, its curriculum and teachers. Student images and
attitudes operate as a kind of external constraint on the teaching
enterprise.
The claims made on a teacher are found in the expectations'of
students. Students create an image of law teachers patterned on
other teachers and other authority figures. The student's image,
reinforced by bureaucratic dogma, creates a role for the teacher to
perform. It is this image which the teacher so often encounters and
to which he falls prey.
Students are concerned with practice-oriented courses and
those which they feel are "required" for the well-rounded lawyer.
Thomas Shaffer and Robert Redmount, in a study of three midwest-
ern law schools, conclude that "[t]he student seeks bar-related and
bar-significant courses. He cannot afford to pursue legal education
as an adventure in learning, and an opportunity for self-learning,
because there appears to him to be no tangible reward or secure
professional preparation in these choices." 53
In attempting to educate students to be responsible lawyers,
the law teacher is caught in the dilemma of teaching students both
pragmatic "practice" skills and a sophisticated theoretical under-
standing of law, its application and evolution. Professional compe-
tence requires ample knowledge of basic rules in addition to intellec-
tual skills of synthesis, conceptual analysis, comprehension, and
criticism. 4
The law teacher must deal with the tension between the de-
mands of a practice-oriented student body and the intellectual com-
ponent of legal education. The polarity in these demands creates a
frustrating situation for the teacher. How is it possible for a teacher
to deal with the fact that some graduates write wills and contracts,
others become prosecutors, serve as legal aid attorneys or work for
the federal government? The diversity in lawyer roles requires law-
yers with a broad range of skills and knowledge. A lawyer must be
acquainted with the traditional body of knowledge and have the
53. SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra note 48, at 20.
54. Christenson, Studying Law as the Possibility of Principled Action, 50 DEN. L. J. 413,
430 (1974).
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ability to apply it. He must also develop a healthy skepticism about
the role of law in society and an intellectual curiosity to prompt
philosophical reflections. The measure of each component will vary
depending on the lawyer's role. 5
The creative impulses of the law teacher are easily dissipated
by the energy directed to dealing with student demands for real,
practical lawyering skills and knowledge of substantive law. The
demands for real experience, for real practical knowledge reduce the
teacher to a perfunctory role of providing information and a suppor-
tive role in showing students how to do law. The effect of such
student demands is present both for the young teacher without the
security of tenure who may feel the pressure of student demands and
for the established teacher who seeks to avoid student dissatisfac-
tion so that he can get on with other things that concern him.
There is little encouragement from administrators or colleagues
to pursue innovative and creative teaching methods. Even with
encouragement, the lack of staff and financial support make inno-
vation difficult. The effect is to discourage innovation and change
in law teaching. In essence, there is "little room for success in
experiments with new means of professionalizing lawyers . . .-.
Given such an environment, it should come as little surprise that
only the exceptional law professor confronts the apathy of "status
55. An emphasis on only the first of these roles results in legal education which is
primarily professional in orientation, although it should also be preparing students for
lives of public service and scholarship. This confusion of goals is tacitly recognized,
and an appearance of unity is maintained by the theory that all three are accomplished
by the law schools' special way of training the mind. But the unity rings false, and
the schools do not accomplish all that they undertake.
Reich, supra note 30, at 1402. See also Allen, supra note 27, at 349:
Nor should it be assumed that concern with practical professional skills is necessarily
at odds with a legal education intellectually based and humanistically motivated.
Attention to practice problems can contribute interest and realism to the study of law
and thus contribute to the realization of the multitudinous objectives of legal educa-
tion, including the enhancement of professional competency. The increased emphasis
on practical skills becomes a threat to university training only when it ignores the
broad range of values and social interests that legal education is called on to cultivate.
A more skeptical assessment is provided in Borosage, Can the Law School Succeed? A
Proposal, 1 YALE REv. L. AND Soc. AcT. 92, 93 (1970):
As an academic institution, the law school might have deemphasized the role of a trade
school and adopted that of a graduate center for the study of law. It could have devoted
itself both to empirical study of the actual functioning of our legal system and to
normative inquiry into the role and nature of law. Instead, the law school has aban-
doned the basic responsibilities of an academic institution, and accepted its poor part
as the training ground for skillful technicians for the corporate elite.
56. SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra note 48, at 20.
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quo-ism" to attempt innovative teaching ideas.57
There is at present no consensus on the role of creativity in law
teaching and legal education. 5 The "traditionalist" teacher is con-
tent with teaching from collected appellate decisions either by lec-
turing on the legal rules reflected in the opinions or by forcing stu-
dents to painfully discover for themselves the legal structure by the
so-called Socratic method 9.5  The goal is professionalism. Law
schools have historically viewed their primary mission as training
lawyers in technical competence, although this mission is both
praised and widely condemned. In at least one respect, the support-
ers and critics of legal education have found common ground in the
absence of concern for the role of creativity in legal education. With
a few exceptions, creativity has been largely ignored by commenta-
tors on legal education."
The truly creative teacher/scholar must indeed embrace a body
of knowledge and reflect his intimate concern with the subject in the
classroom. The "good teacher" who can double as a creative scholar
needs an inquiring mind, the power of analysis, intuition and self-
discipline, and a tendency toward introspection." This still tells us
very little about the classroom teacher.
The truly good teacher is a paradox in that his skill lies in doing
less rather than more. The emphasis in law schools on teaching a
substantive body of legal rules has obscured the student's responsi-
bility in the learning environment. The failure to take appropriate
account of the student was recognized by Charles Reich before his
departure from the ranks of law teaching:
Law schools do little to encourage students to use initiative in educating
themselves. Students are not really treated as adults. They are made to feel
that they are beginning their education all over again, and the classes put
very little emphasis upon individual work and thinking. The students get
57. Id. at 21.
58. Compare Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L. J. 444
(1970), and Stone, supra note 11, at 392.
59. There is now some question as to the extent to which the widely discussed Socratic
method is actually used in the classroom. The author's experience in teaching in three law
schools would confirm that the Socratic method has been largely abandoned or severely
modified in actual use.
60. The exceptions include Macleod, Creative Problem-Solving-For Lawyers?!, 16 J.
LEGAL Enuc. 198 (1963); and Yeamans, Creativity and Legal Education, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC.
381 (1971).
61. See Brown, The Development of Creative Teacher-Scholars, in CEATvrrY AND
LaI ANiNG 164-80 (J. Kagan ed. 1967).
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caught up in examinations, grades, and class ranking. In many ways the
LL.B. program is undergraduate, not graduate education.
2
Carl Rogers argues that significant facilitation of learning is due to
the personal relationship of teacher and student." To stress this
aspect of learning Rogers refers to the teacher as a "facilitator." The
emphasis is on facilitation of learning as contrasted to a focus on
teaching." Rogers finds genuineness65 and empathy to be two impor-
tant qualities of the teacher-facilitator.
The idea of empathy is based on an awareness of another person
and the fact of their difference. James White in The Legal
Imagination suggests a relationship between empathy and active
imagination. He finds that imagination begins "when you first face
a client or a judge and ask yourself 'who is this person?' in a way
that recognizes that he may be different from you. . . . 'Who is this
person and how shall I address him?' is a constant question in the
life of the lawyer .. ."66
For the teacher, the question is, how shall I address this person
who has come to this place to learn? Who is this person and what
can we make of our relationship? An empathic teacher sees the
world through the eyes of the student and shares the student's world
with him. Empathy is, in effect, a special way of seeing.
To see, means to stand somewhere in a certain way. Vision is not confined
to the eyes, but involves other parts of the body. Seeing is a posture, an
62. Reich, supra note 30, at 1403.
63. See Rogers, The Interpersonal Relationship in the Facilitation of Learning, in Naw
DmECTIONS IN CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY 468, 471 (1970).
64. Id. at 481-82.
65. When the facilitator is a real person, being what he is, entering into a rela-
tionship with the learner without presenting a front or a facade, he is much more likely
to be effective. This means that the feelings which he is experiencing are available to
him, available to his awareness, that he is able to live these feelings, be them, and able
to communicate them if appropriate. It means that he comes into a direct personal
encounter with the learner, meeting him on a person-to-person basis. It means that
he is being himself, not denying himself.
Seen from this point of view it is suggested that the teacher can be a real person
in his relationship with his students. He can be enthusiastic, he can be bored, he can
be interested in students, he can be angry, he can be sensitive and sympathetic.
Because he accepts these feelings as his own he has no need to impose them on his
students. He can like or dislike a student product without implying that it is objec-
tively good or bad or that the student is good or bad. He is simply expressing a feeling
for the product, a feeling which exists within himself. Thus, he is a person to his
students, not a faceless embodiment of a curricular requirement nor a sterile tube
through which knowledge is passed from one generation to the next.
Rogers, supra note 63, at 471.
66. J. WHrIE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 758 (1973).
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attitude. Hence to see through the other's eyes means to stand in another way
which means to move. One must move to the other's place to see in another
way. To see through the eyes of another is seeing psychologically."
Abraham Maslow, one of the founders of humanistic psychology,
finds an analogy in the teacher and the farmer.
The good farmer simply throws out seeds, sets up good growing conditions,
and then gets out of the way of the growing seeds most of the time, helping
them only where they really need help. He doesn't pull up the sprouting seed
to see if it's doing all right; he doesn't twist it, or train it or shove it around
or put it back in the soil, or whatever. He just leaves it alone, giving it the
minimum necessary help."8
We can be assured that the discussion of the "good teacher" will not
be resolved. I am reminded of Loren Eisely's suggestion that society
is never totally sure of what it wants of its educators. 9 If society,
the legal profession, and professional academics cannot agree on
what the "good teacher" does and how he should relate to students,
then we may find it necessary to recognize "the pluralism in teach-
ing, the many styles of influence, the many modes of connection
that bind student and teacher to each other."70 Finding a "good
teacher" is complex.
Finally, the task of the creative teacher is to provide students
not only with theories of and about law but also with new images of
the lawyer and his work. Even this essay has at times, by its empha-
sis on the real and the ideal, suggested two polar images71 - the
practical lawyer and the artist. Other images of the lawyer which
67. Lecture presented by Robert Romansyhn at the 1st Summer Institute in Archetypal
Psychology, University of Notre Dame (June, 1978).
68. MAsLOW, supra note 8, at 178.
69. L. ELSELEY, THE NIGHT CouNTRY 210 (1971).
70. Adelson, The Teacher as a Model, in INTERERSONAL DYNA cs 335, 335 (3d ed.
1973). Cf. Brown, supra note 61, at 176-77:
In the evaluation of the qualities of a creative teacher-scholar as a teacher, it is neces-
sary to keep clearly in mind the role in which he can contribute most. There are
teachers of enthusiasm and effectiveness who make the art of teaching at a more
elementary level a life-long subject of study. A number of such scholars of teaching
are a valuable supporting cast in any university. Their facility in attracting student
interest in what is already known should not be permitted to upstage the teacher-
scholar who in his drive toward discovery of new approaches and ideas in his discipline
may at times leave his students breathless and confused. The ideal, of course, is the
perfect blend of the dynamic scholar and the ever-lucid, ever-patient teacher; but in
the absence of any large reservoir of such persons, most universities must be satisfied
with the compensating attributes of a balanced team. It is the task of the university,
however, to establish the assumption that the precious norm is the balanced teacher-
scholar, and that onesideness is a shortcoming rather than a source of distinction.
71. These polar images have been described elsewhere as Pericles and the Plumber. See
Twining, Pericles and the Plumber, 83 L. Q. REv. 396 (1967).
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may point to an integration of the practical and the artistic (as in
the artisan or craftsman) are the lawyer as literary critic,7 2 archi-
tect,73 historian, 4 futurologist, and performer. 5 Such images of the
lawyer envisioned by the teacher expand our awareness of what it
means to be a lawyer. These images of law are the work of the
teacher as artist in making that which was invisible "visible," and
thereby possible. The teacher cannot teach a law student how to
become a lawyer-artist. A law school "can only provide a place for
the student to learn the limits of law and the love of human beings
which give the artist his form and his power."7
IV. THE LAWYER
Each of us has been given a life which we devote primarily to work.
Our lives as lawyers are busy and crowded. We are most unlike
those who lead a contemplative life, and a life of meditation and
reflection. 77 Consequently, we live in a world of activity comprised
72. Lawyers "deal in an everyday way with the very stuff of literary art and criticism:
close readings of texts, precedent, form and structure, and language itself. . . [Tjhey face
moments of complex psychological significance and high human drama." Weisberg,
Comparative Law in Comparative Literature: The Figure of the "Examining Magistrate" in
Dostoevski and Camus, 29 RUGERs L. REV. 237 (1976).
This image of the lawyer suggests that the law teacher ask himself whether he communi-
cates to students the value of careful and lucid writing, awareness of rhetoric devices, and
close reading of text.
73. Paul Freund has argued that law and architecture have much in common:"Each
must employ tested materials to bring into being a vision of order; each is linked to the past
and its masters while seeking emancipation through new forms and new creations. Each owes
its special fascination and challenge to its being both an art and a science." Freund,
Dedication Address: The Mission of the Law School, 9 UTAH L. REV. 45 (1965).
74. See J. FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL: MYTHS AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 37-40
(Atheneum ed. 1970).
75. In what sense do students, teachers, and lawyers perform? What does it mean to
perform, to realize that what one does can be viewed as a performance? What is the relation-
ship between performing and identity? Compare BENSMAN & LILIENFELD, supra note 6, at 51-
58 and E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). BENSMAN &
LILiENFELD, at 58, suggest: "If the performer is able to retain and then to transcend theory
and technique, he reaches the point of becoming an artist."
76. Christenson, In Pursuit of the Art of Law, 21 AMER. U. L. REv. 629, 632 (1972). On
the limits to creativity of the lawyer, see T. SHAFFER, supra note 16, at 279-93.
77. Contemporary man .. . fears inner silence and avoids places that induce
inner silence, be they deserts or mountains or empty stretches of ocean. In case their
inner noisemaker ever fails them and by some accident falls silent, they carry with
them portable radios, drowning any awareness they might happen to develop in a wash
of senseless sound. Should this recourse fail, they hasten to some party where, in an
atmosphere poisoned by the fumes of alcohol or tobacco, they exchange at the tops of
their voices a stream of inanities concerning their own or other people's lives.
R. DERoPP, THE MASTER GAME 74-75 (1968).
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primarily of work which we periodically and temporarily punctuate
with leisure.
Thomas Merton, the Trappist monk who lived much of his later
life in solitude, characterized our present situation asTone in which
our very soul is projected into our work activity. Merton sees in this
work the sad spectacle of "a madman who sleeps -on the sidewalk
in front of his house instead of living inside where it is quiet and
warm." '78 Lawyers in particular often find it difficult to get inside
where it is quiet and warm."
The lawyer often chooses the path of routinization of everyday
experience, whereby he becomes a bureaucratic legal technician
who ascertains rules and applies them to concrete factual situations.
Routinization of rule finding and application reduces the lawyer to
a legal plumber. The simple questions are whether the law can "fix"
the problem or "tell me what to do." As a last resort, he will ask a
court to determine the legal rights of the parties and finally resolve
the dispute.
The constant repetition in solving narrow legal problems can
convince the "realist" lawyer that lawyering is a very practical sort
of profession which requires very practical skills. To this end, the
profession is blessed with a legal periodical called The Practical
Lawyer. So it is indeed possible that one's life in law can be experi-
enced as nothing more or less than providing a practical service for
a fee."0
I would suggest that a relatively small percentage of the lawyers
in this country want or would offer such a bleak description of their
lives as lawyers. Members of the profession have historically enjoyed
78. T. MERTON, No MAN Is AN ISLAND 98 (Image Books ed. 1967).
79. In some way, one must at times silence the familiar and welcome the strange. S.
KEEN, TO A DANCING GOD 28 (1970). Each of us has a tendency to let "present needs, past
experience, or expectations for the future" determine what we see. Id.
Sam Keen has informed us that to appreciate the uniqueness of a particular time, place,
or person, one must be sufficiently aware of "preconceived ideas and characteristic emotional
distortions to bracket them long enough to welcome strangeness and novelty" into one's
perceptual world. Id. "This discipline of bracketing, compensating, or silencing requires
sophisticated self-knowledge and courageous honesty. Yet, without this discipline each pres-
ent moment is only the repetition of something already seen or experienced." Id.
80. There is some support for such an experience in the mode of financing for the
delivery of legal services, the primary means still being the private fee for services. It is not
clear, however, that a different financing scheme would produce a different experience for the
lawyer. A not uncommon experience for legal aid attorneys who are publicly financed is a
"burnout" on the glut of "run-of-the-mill" legal problems. The mode of financing is obviously
not a causal factor in the way one experiences the paradox of the real and the ideal in
lawyering.
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a social status and financial and political success which belie the
argument that they are mere service technicians.
Absent a "psychic numbing" to the social and personal prob-
lems presented through the personal interaction with clients and
other lawyers, a lawyer will surely find himself in a world as "un-
real" as it is "real." It is hard to fathom how one can deal with
clients, ranging from the confident, rational, knowledgeable busi-
ness owner to the emotionally distraught divorce client, without
realizing that law relates to people and is therefore as unpredictable
and imponderable as only people can be.
Lawyers deal with a variety of people: the "guilty" criminal
who manipulates his lawyer and commits perjury on the witness
stand; the corporate client who presses hard to suppress company
information which the lawyer feels may be required by law to be
disclosed to the public; the political or social activist who feels more
strongly about the cause than about himself. In these situations, the
"feeling" aspect of the attorney-client relationship and the ethical
dimension are joined. A quick study of the problems of "professional
responsibility" will convince even the most skeptical that lawyers
often work in an "ethical vacuum" which only heightens the para-
doxical dilemma posed by the real and the ideal.
Not only does the lawyer confront an immense array of people
problems, he faces an uncertain existence on a variety of fronts.
Finally there is the paradox of the law itself. Cardozo viewed the
paradox as an antithesis between rest and motion, stability and
progress."1 He recognized that the very prospect of change places
inherent limitations on the complacency and conservatism of law
and on the lawyer as well.
We live in a world of change. If a body of law were in existence adequate for
the civilization of today, it could not meet the demands of the civilization of
tomorrow. Society is inconstant. So long as it is inconstant, and to the extent
of such inconstancy, there can be no constancy in law.
12
In a world of change, stare decisis is not the central feature of the
legal system but a polar position which emphasizes uniformity and
symmetry which in turn must ultimately be balanced by considera-
tions of equity and justice. 3 Cardozo argued that a "wise eclecti-
cism" from both poles should shape the judicial process. 4 Such
81. B. CA Dozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 7 (1928).
82. Id. at 10-11.
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id. at 8-9.
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concerns are not, however, limited to the judge.
Lawyers also must judge. Each of us must be held responsible
for the life he chooses. That choice is all too often buried in the
obligations of profession, family, geography, and personal-biological
imperative. Even an unconscious choice is a response. In fact, our
legal system itself is based on the assumption that each citizen has
the ability to make an informed, rational, free choice about his own
behavior.
8 5
It is tempting to choose to see the world in simple, pragmatic,
non-paradoxical terms. Man's basic insecurity pushes in that direc-
tion as he seeks certainty. To pursue certainty in a world and a
discipline like law in which little can be known definitively under-
mines the reality of law.8 That choice is simply an intellectual
rationalization of our blindness; it is simply a way of not facing the
paradox within which we live. The power of choice "can scarcely
exist at all until he [the lawyer, law professor, or law student] has
analyzed the forces which impinge upon him, until he has discov-
ered what kind of intellectual climate it is he lives in."" Commonly,
we work toward a position, a status, a role, where we will no longer
be required to make difficult choices.
The lawyer who honestly confronts the ethical dilemmas in
legal practice, the emotional feeling of the client,'S the complicity
and injustice in judging, 9 and the uncertainty of law in a changing
world must do so without forewarning from legal educators and
85. The assumption, if we take our lessons from Freud, is unfounded. A growing body
of legal literature suggests that the legal system could benefit from a psychoanalytically-
oriented jurisprudence.
86. The certainty and order attributed to law are largely mythical. See J. FRANK, supra
note 74. It is the work of the lawyer artist to understand the myth-like structure of law.
Myth has been used in a variety of contexts to explore the nature of social phenomena.
See E. CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE (1946) (the state as myth); J. CAMPBELL, MYTHS TO
LivE By (Bantam ed. 1973) (the role of myths in our everyday life); M. EDELMAN, THE
SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (Illini Books ed. 1972) (politics as myth); S. FREUD, THE FUTURE
OF AN ILLUSION (E. Jones ed. 1928) (religion as myth); J. PEARCE, THE CRACK IN Tim Cosmic
EGG (reality as myth); G. ROHEim, THE ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF CULTURE (1943) (culture as
myth); BERGAN & ROSENBERG, THE NEW NON-FREuDANs: PSYCHOANALYTIc DIMENSIONS OF SO-
CIAL CHANGE 34 Psychiary 19, 23 (Feb. 1971) (culture as myth); S. SCHmNGoLD, THE PoLTIcs
OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POuCY, AND POLrnICAL CHANoE (1974) (legal rights as myths).
87. L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 16 (1940).
88. On dealing with clients and ourselves on the "feeling" level, see Elkins, A Counsel-
ing Model for Lawyering in Divorce Cases, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 229 (1977). See also A.
WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS (rev. ed. 1978).
89. See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTMLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESs (1975);
Bollinger, The Homer of the Pacific: Melville's Art and the Ambiguities of Judging Evil, 75
MICH. L. REv. 823 (1977).
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often without an adequate map of the terrain which must be tra-
versed.
The undesirable nature of the present state of affairs is obvious.
Its corrosive effect extends from the law student to lawyer to legal
profession. But most importantly, it is regrettable for those individ-
uals who will make their lives in law. The alienation, dehumaniza-
tion, and cynicism of law school and legal practice can be averted
only when we begin the search "for ways to express and share more
fully our humanness in our educational and professional lives."' "
Only then can we restore the possibility of finding in law "a life that
is richly creative."9 The initial task is to rekindle the spirit of ad-
venture which should accompany learning and lawyering.
Each of us seeks "guidance for our activity as we decide, choose,
commit ourselves, and otherwise bear the burden of our necessary
human freedom. 12 The goal that should guide the law student,
teacher and lawyer is the potentiality for imagination and creativity
in lawyering.
James White has correctly reminded us that the professional
life of the lawyer "constitute[s] an enterprise of the imagination,
an enterprise whose central performance is the claim of meaning
against the odds: [t]he translation of the imagination into reality
'M Imagination and creativity ultimately require a new image
90. Himmelstein, supra note 26, at 516.
91. Reich, supra note 30, at 1408.
92. H. ICHARD Nl uHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF 48 (1963).
93. J. WHrrE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 758 (1973). A similar theme has been pressed in
areas far removed from the legal profession, for example, in politics, history, and science.
"[The study of politics must neither neglect the fact that man is an imagining and myth-
making animal, nor fail to make explicit allowances for the necessary entry of imagination
and myth-making into the study itself." O'Brien, Imagination and Politics, in POWER AND
CONSCIOUSNESs 203, 211 (1969). "Exercising the imagination is an important part of historical
thinking, and it does consist in trying, so far as we can, to put ourselves in the places of those
whose actions we are studying." Walsh, Can History Be Objective?, in Tan PmLOSOPHy OF
HIsTORY iN OuR TIME 216, 221-22 (H. Meyerhoff ed. 1959).
Imagination plays a similar role in science:
All advances of scientific understanding, at every level, begin with a speculative ad-
venture, and imaginative preconception of what might be true - a preconception
which always, and necessarily, goes a little way (sometimes a long way) beyond any-
thing which we have logical or factual authority to believe in. It is the invention of a
possible world, or of a tiny fraction of that world. The conjecture is then exposed to
criticism to find out whether or not that imagined world is anything like the real one.
Scientific reasoning is therefore at all levels an interaction between two episodes of
thought - a dialogue between two voices, the one imaginative and the other critical;
a dialogue, if you like, between the possible and the actual, between proposal and
disposal, conjecture and criticism, between what might be true and what is in fact the
case.
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of man-the image of the person as a creator of meaning for his own
experience 4-the image of the artist. 5
V. THE LAWYER AS ARTIST
There are no easy answers for questions raised by pragmatist
friends or for the pragmatist within you. The paradox for the law
student/teacher/lawyer is that the legal world is at the same time a
pragmatic world of technical skills and craftlike precision and a
world of theories and ideals of legal justice, fairness, and equality.
In such a paradoxical world, the lawyer-artist is our guide.
Our common image of the lawyer is not as an artist. We com-
monly consider a painter, poet, or sculptor to be an artist. Perhaps
even an architect, 8 a potter, or a novelist is an artist, although to
extend the term even to the latter group may be unacceptable to
some. The question of who can properly be called an artist deserves
additional consideration.
The need to differentiate the painter from the architect pre-
sents us with one aspect of the work of the artist: that "art in all its
forms is bounded on one side by the practically useful . . ."g and
on the other by the notion of art for the sake of art. Thus, we speak
of the artist as one who creates a work of art, especially the painter
and sculptor, and the artisan as one skilled in making something, a
craftsman. The lawyer is both craftsman and artist.
P. B. MEDAWAR, Science and Literature, in THE HOPE OF PROGRESS 18, 22 (1972). Cf. SARTRE,
The Psychology of Imagination, in ExisTENTrAL ENCOUNTERS FOR TEACHERS 145-47 (M. Greene
ed. 1967).
94. See E. BECKER, THE STRUCTURE OF EvIL 170-71 (1968).
95. The attempt to recover a sense of how a life in law can be creative and the lawyer
experience himself as an artist parallels a similar attempt in other disciplines. On the
historian as artist, see BENSMAN & L=LNEL, supra note 6, at 115-34 ("In the sense that there
are options and choices in the selection of imagery with which one refers to a period, history
is an art and not a science." Id. at 116 (footnote omitted)). Cf. Robertson, Clio in the New
World, in THE HIsToRLAN's WORKSHOP 103, 117-19 (L. Curtis ed. 1970).
On the engineer as artist, see S. FLORMAN, THE ExisTENTmL PLEASURES OF ENGUNEERING
99-126 (1976). In psychotherapy see Landau, The Creative Approach to Psychotherapy, 27
AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 4 (1973). In sociology, see R. NISBr, SoCIoLoGY AS AN ART FoRM (1976).
On the teacher as an artist, see J. AXELROD, THE UNIVETrrY TEACHER As AnTIsT (1973);
EIsELEY, supra note 69, at 200-02, 219 (1971). See also G. IGHET,THE ART OFTEACHING (1950).
Even farming has been described as an art. See BERRY, supra note 12, at 87. ("There is an
inescapable kinship between farming and art, for farming depends as much on character,
devotion, imagination, and the sense of structure, as on knowledge. It is a practical art.")
96. One wonders as did Tolstoy whether in architecture there are not some "simple
buildings which are not objects of art, and buildings with artistic pretensions which are
unsuccessful and ugly and therefore not to be considered works of art?" Tolstoy, What Is Art?,
in ART AND PHILOSOPHY 7, 7 (W. Kennick ed. 1964).
97. Id.
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A view of the lawyer as an artist and a craftsman is an integra-
tion in recognition of an earlier era when homo faber (man the
maker-worker) and homa poeta (man the creator of meaning) were
one and the same. We should not forget that "art does not begin
with freedom and beauty for beauty's sake. It begins with making
instruments for human life, canoes, vases, arrows, necklaces, or wall
paintings destined to subject, through magical or nonmagical signs,
the human environment to the mastery of man. . .. ,,g8 The Latin
derivative of artist is "ars," which means a way of being or of acting,
hence a skill or talent.9 The artistry of lawyering involves'-an at-
tempt to integrate the required craftsmanlike skills and the creative
function in law.
The artistry of the law and lawyering can be seen when we view
lawyering as a craft. The word "craft" today, although associated
with a skill or ability, is usually limited in usage to hand-produced
items indigenous to a particular person, group or geographical re-
gion. Craft is also the root of "crafty," the skill of evasion or decep-
tion. Perhaps we should seek to find what it is in the way that
lawyers do their work which leads to a recognition of its craft-
likeness.
Michael Maccoby, in a recent work on the social psychology of
corporate managers, sees the craftsman as one who "has a sense of
self-worth based on knowledge, skill, discipline, and self-
reliance."1 °0 Maccoby found that the corporate craftsman, although
interested in success and money, "is motivated even more by the
problem to be solved, the challenge of the work itself and his satis-
faction in creating something of quality."'01 Even the corporate
craftsman's dreams were frequently of solving problems.
The lawyer-artist requires technical competence. °10 Throughout
his diverse writings, Karl Llewellyn argued forcibly for technical
competence.' 3 The creative lawyer and lawyer artisan must attain
a high level of technical competence in order to perform as a legal
craftsman. Alan Stone, a psychoanalyst on the Harvard Law School
faculty, puts it this way: "If creativity is to occur, the student must
first master the mass of cognitive information necessary to inform
his creative efforts-one must first become an artisan before he can
98. See J. MAorrAI, CREATIVE INTUITION IN ART AND PoEmY 45 (1953).
99. E. PARTRIDGE, ORIGRis 27 (1958).
100. M. MACCOBY, THE GAMESMAN: THE NEW CORPORATE LEADERS 43 (Bantam ed. 1978).
101. Id. at 45.
102. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 380-81.
103. Id. at 380. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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become an artist. °10 4
What does it mean to be technically competent? In essence, "a
craft means skills,"'0 5 and technical competence lies in the skilled
way in which we engage ourselves in the legal system.' 6
104. Stone, supra note 11, at 420-21. Stone expresses ambivalence about the movement
from artisan to artist:
Most of professional training, by its very nature, demands the acquisition of large
amounts of new cognitive data. This learning task is essential to professional compe-
tence and does not allow for instant creativity. Were the student to approach his
professional education ab initio with the expectation that he would find great oppor-
tunities in which to be immediately creative, he would most certainly be bitterly
confused and disappointed. Mastering a series of legal cases can be an exciting intellec-
tual challenge, as can be learning all of the branches of the carotid artery, but these
sorts of learning cannot be a discovery of something unknown to others nor, except by
the most strained interpretation, can there be instantly creative experiences in this
process. The realities of a generalist professional education are for most people incom-
patible with being creative; to suggest otherwise is a cruel hoax.
Id. at 421.
It is commonly recognized that some kind of transformation is taking place in law school.
Interestingly enough, creativity involves a transformation of the old into the new, the mun-
dane into the surprising. Is it possible to view the very process of legal education as an
evolving act of creativity - the changing of one view of the world into another? Legal
education in this sense is viewed as a creative act which "alter[s] the viewer's conventional
way of perceiving or thinking about the world. . . .A transforming object invites the viewer
to move out, intellectually, in new directions - it stimulates him to consider its conse-
quences." Jackson & Messick, The Person, the Product, and the Response: Conceptual Prob-
lems in the Assessment of Creativity, in CREATIVrY AND LEARNING 1, 9-10 (J. Kagan ed. 1968).
105. LLEwELLYN, supra note 34, at 365; Fortas, The Training of the Practitioner, in THa
LAw SCHOOL OF ToMoRRow 179, 184 (1968).
106. Llewellyn noted that
the essence of our craftsmanship lies in skills, and in wisdoms; in practical, effective,
persuasive, inventive skills for getting things done, any kind of thing in any field; in
wisdom and judgment in selecting the things to get done; in skills for moving men into
desired action, any kind of man, in any field; and then in skills for regularizing the
results, for building into controlled large-scale action such doing of things and such
moving of men.
Llewellyn, supra note 34, at 318.
The skills of the legal profession are most often associated with problem solving. Lawyers
are problem solvers, because they "reach and implement decisions." Kelso, In Quest of a
Theory for Lawyering 29 U. MsAMI L. REV. 159, 161 (1975). Cf. T. SHAFFER, supra note 16.
Lawyers engage in problem-solving behavior to reach decisions in and for situations
involving the possible application of power, usually governmental power. The law is almost
always involved. Of course, the decisive considerations are rarely limited to how the law
probably will apply to given facts. Also important are the values sought to be advanced or
protected by the lawyer's advice and action, and the probable consequences of law applica-
tion. Kelso, supra, at 161. Legal problem solving involves specific skills and techniques which
require mastery by the true craftsman. Id. at 163.
Critics of legal education have pointed that the law school's emphasis on law as opposed
to lawyering has left unemphasized certain features of the problem-solving role of lawyers.
For example, little instruction is provided on:
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The lawyer-artisan has an inquiring mind with the power to
analyze a specific problem. ' 7 Law schools place heavy emphasis on
the acquisition of analytical skills. Analytical skills require the abil-
ity to work through a problem, beginning with problem definition,
fact analysis, search for applicable legal and nonlegal solutions,
determining solution ranges or outcomes acceptable and/or desir-
able to the client, and a value judgment as to appropriate means
and ends. Finally, a creative lawyer must temper his analytical
1) How to generate relevant facts in addition to those reported by a client or included
in an appellate opinion,
2) The human and value aspects of legal problems, and
3) Lawyering techniques and procedures (e.g., trial advocacy, negotiating and draft-
ing), the efficacy of which enter into decisions on basic strategy for dealing with a problem.
Id. at 162.
On problem-solving strategies, see R. THOMPSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING (Penguin
Books ed. 1959), and J. BRUNER, J. GooDNow & G. AUSTIN, A STUDY OF THINKING (1956).
107. In some instances, the power to analyze a specific problem must be supplemented
by "the technique of inventing policy alternatives." Lawyers in the role of executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial policy makers are often confronted by polycentric problems which on first
analysis defy solution. The solutionless problem demands a more sophisticated model for
analysis than the one presented here. See generally Lasswell, Current Studies of the Decision
Process: Automation versus Creativity, 8 W. POL. Q. 381 (1955).
The characterization of any problem as solutionless may involve an overstatement. A
better description may be that of Ralf Dahrendorf, who notes:
We are living in a period in which our potential for realizing human life-changes has
outgrown the ways in which these life-changes are organized in our societies. We can
survive, and we can have more justice, and we can have both in liberty, but our habits
and institutions make it difficult for us to do what we could do. And when I speak of
what we "could" do, I do not mean an imagined world, utopia, but the potential of
solutions, technical, economic, social, even psychological, which is already there. If we
pass through a critical period, it is a crisis of the ways in which we have organized our
affairs, not of the capacity which we have developed to cope with our problems.
R. DA 0tmoRF, THE NEw LmERTY: SURVIVAL AND JUSTICE IN A CHANGING WORLD 23 (1975).
Sociologist Daniel Bell argues that present social purposes and assumptions are not
adequate. See D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 251 (1976): "The
consumer-oriented, free-enterprise society no longer morally satisfies the citizenry, as it once
did. And a new public philosophy will have to be created in order that something we recognize
as a liberal society may survive."
The question which should be raised is what role the legal profession will play in devising
a "new public philosophy." Arguably, that role should be de minimus unless the fullest range
of imagination and creativity is available to the lawyers who seek to play such a role. It was
Robert Hutehins, the lawyer-trained academician, who warned:
The responsibilities and opportunities of the university and the law school are now
greater than ever. Society needs centers of independent thought and criticism as never
before. The law faces new problems that must be solved if civilization is to survive.
The university is the place where wisdom can be generated. The law needs that wisdom
and must contribute to it. Other civilizations have fallen because of the barbarians
without. That may happen to us. But it seems more likely that we may fall prey to
the barbarians within, from which the university and the law might save us.
Hutchins, supra note 29, at 17.
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reasoning with a critical perspective. '
We have identified analytical and critical skills necessary for
the lawyer-artisan and must finally add "creative skills" to the
repertoire. It is difficult to describe the potential artistry of the
lawyer with our limited language. It cannot be known in the sense
that one gives a written or verbal description of it."'9 It involves a
kind of tacit knowledge.110 Creative skills involve synthesis, the con-
struction of alternative modes of handling problems, and ingenuity
in inventing legal structures to advance the public good.' Creativ-
ity requires "the nurturing of those inner resources of ingenuity and
the use of all relevant knowledge and discipline in the solution of
108. Critical skills require the appraisal or the evaluation of a legal decision or
process in relation to criteria which each person identifies and clarifies explicitly. This
intellectual skill is particularly necessary in avoiding the dangers of blind comitment
to action as a participant - for example, as an advocate or decision-maker. At some
point it is essential to appraise an appellate decision, a piece of legislation, a govern-
ment action, or a position in defense of a client according to external criteria. Is the
decision logically necessary? Is it sound? Is the legislation designed to meet demon-
strated need but no more? Is the defense believable as well as logical? Does the action
have intellectual integrity? Does it hide emotion in verbalism either wittingly or
unwittingly? Is the reasoning internally consistent? Is the process comprehensive? This
judgmental skill is among the most difficult to learn and among the most valuable for
principled action.
Christenson, Studying Law as the Possibility of Principled Action, 50 DEN. L. J. 413, 430-31
(1974).
109. There is no body of rules expressing the art of the lawyer any more than that
of the sculptor or painter. You are as free as they, and as responsible for what you do.
It is true that one of the mediums of the lawyer's art is rules, and the lawyer must
know rules, and the other materials of the law, as the sculptor must know clay and
the painter paint and canvas. . . .But what you must ultimately learn is what to
do with rules and judicial opinions and all the other forms of expression that are the
working stuff of a lawyer's life, just as the sculptor must learn what to do with clay
and marble.
J. White, supra note 66, at xxv.
110. Gregory Bateson has made a similar observation about skills: "The sensations and
qualities of skill can never be put in words, and yet the fact of skill is conscious." G. BATESON,
STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF MIND: COLLECTED ESSAYS IN ANTHROPOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY, EvoLuTION
AND EPISTEMOLOGY 138 (1972). "The problem here lies in the fact that the performance of a
skill is in part unconscious to the performer." Id. at 137.
"The thought of skilled craftsmen and performers of all kinds, and also of game players,
is often particularly inaccessible to their own reflection; reflection is precisely the kind of
thought, or topic of thought, in which their skill does not reside, unless they are also teach-
ers." Hampshire, The Explanation of Thought, in THOUGHT, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND REALITY 3,
6 (J. Smith ed. 1977).
A recent and largely successful effort to express the feeling of the skilled craftsman/artist
can be found in R. PrsIo, supra note 31. For a review of the work and its relation to the setting
of legal education, see Parker, Review of ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE With
Some Remarks on the Teaching of Law, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 318 (1976).
111. Christenson, supra note 108, at 431.
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important legal problems."''
Karl Llewellyn has observed that "[iut is the craftsman who
mediates between the people and the structured rules and forms of
law."" 3 It requires knowledge of the law, an understanding of
human behavior, an ability to communicate (which includes the art
of listening and presentation), and finally an ability to mold all of
these factors into a solution to a human problem. It is in this process
that Llewellyn finds "legal esthetics" to be "in the first essence
functional esthetics."
4
In this sense, the lawyer is not only an advocate, one who argues
for a cause or a person, but an intermediary, a bridge between
persons (individual or corporation), and between persons and the
state, the formal representation of social order. In this business of
representing individuals seeking to resolve personal and social con-
flict, the lawyer's work can be viewed much like the work of the
poet. Archibald MacLeish, an eminent American poet and graduate
of Harvard Law School has suggested that
The business of the law is to make sense of the confusion of what we call
human life-to reduce it to order but at the same time to give it possibility,
scope, even dignity.
But what, then, is the business of poetry? Precisely to make sense of the
chaos of our lives. To create the understanding of our lives. To compose an
order which the bewildered, angry heart can recognize. To imagine man.
Invent the age, invent the metaphor. Without a credible structure of law
a society is inconceivable. Without a workable poetry no society can conceive
a man.-'
Llewellyn provides the compass for our discussion in his obser-
vation that style expresses the relationship of a craftsman to his
work and his society."' To explore the artistry of the legal craftsman
will require consideration of the aesthetics of craftsmanship, that is,
the style"7 which emerges from the functional aspects of lawyer-
112. Id.
113. Llewellyn, supra note 21, at 233.
114. Id. at 229.
115. MacLeish, Apologia, 85 HAv. L. Ray. 1505 (1972). Although MacLeish willingly
admits of significant differences between the means of poetry and the means of law, he argues
that the actual gulf between poetry and law is not a wide one.
"Art can be defined as the imposing of a measure of order on the disorder of experience,
while respecting and not suppressing the underlying diversity, spontaneity, and disarray. Is
not this likewise the meaning and function of law?" Freund, supra note 73, at 45.
116. Llewellyn, supra note 21, at 224.
117. Llewellyn defines style as "a set of pressures channeling technique and imagina-
tion, a set of pressures which have come (rarely by design) to interlock into a sensible whole."
Id. at 237. See also PEcKIng, supra note 9, at 22-24.
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There exists in American society a tension between "work" and
"living" (or "leisure") which is unknown to the craftsman."'
Today's widely held view that work is "something necessary so that
something else - living - is possible" is alien to the concept of the
lawyer as craftsman.2 0
The struggle and conflict between professional and private life
has in part been responsible for the emergence of a new mode of
lawyering which reflects a new life-style: the public interest lawyer.
The quest for self-realization and the demand for "personally fulfill-
ing work" led lawyers into public interest work in order to "integrate
their personal values and their professional world."' 2'
The public interest lawyer has sought to attain technical com-
petence while assuming personal responsibility for the work and the
effect of that work.' 22 Public interest lawyering involves to some
extent an "abandonment of the traditional concept of professional
neutrality, a concept in which the lawyer does not identify himself
with the goals of the client or with the outcome of a matter or its
social consequences."' 3
The lawyer-artist needs a sense of identity. "A sense of identity
means a sense of being at one with oneself as one grows and devel-
ops; and it means at the same time a sense of affinity with a com-
munity's sense of being at one with its future as well as its his-
tory-or mythology.
'' 24
118. The lawyer technician is much like the functional dresser - one who wears clothes
to be protected from the rays of the sun and the cold of winter. The dress is undoubtedly
simple, functional, and worn in such a way that it does not call attention to the wearer. A
substantial part of the population wears clothers in this manner, and I think it is safe to
assume that the dress of the lawyer technician is attractive to many.
Contrast the dress of the functionalist with one who is very conscious of clothes and wears
them with full awareness that clothes are a part of the image that one projects. The clothes-
conscious person is concerned not only with the functional aspect of clothing but with clothes
fashion.
It is the blend between functionalism, fashion, and an awareness of image that leads to
style in dressing. The same can be said of the lawyer. In a broader context, style in law reflects
the basic premise that law is not only a tool for problem solving but is autonomous to the
point of meriting study as a culture. As a culture, law is possessed of its own language,
symbols, and myths, which embody a professional legal ethos or "world view." See S. SCHMN-
GOLD, supra note 16; J. SHLLAR, LEGALMM (1964).
119. See F. MARKS, K. LEswING & B. For~iNsKY, supra note 28, at 210.
120. Id.
121. Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L. J. 1069, 1146 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as The New Public Interest Lawyers].
122. Compare id. at 1139.
123. F. MARKS, K. LESWING & B. FORTiNSKY, supra note 28, at 201.
124. E. ERKSON, DmENSIONS OF A NEW IDENTITY 27-28 (1974). For a more extensive
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Public interest lawyers have attempted to "strike a satisfying
balance between the demands of the craft, social concerns, and
personal needs"' s and in so doing have moved the profession to
"question the basic assumptions and forms of the profession. Be-
hind the questioning will be the vision of a new kind of law, more
humane for the people whose lives it orders and for its practitioners
as well."' 26 The career role of the public interest lawyer "represents
a tentative compromise between personal values and societal con-
cerns, risk and security, reality and dreams."' 2 In sum, the public
interest lawyer has fused personal and social consciousness in a new
mode of lawyering and a new style of life in law.1
2
VI. CONCLUSION
The paradox of the pragmatic world of lawyering (a world of techni-
cal skills and precision) and the world of theories and ideals of legal
justice, fairness, and equality can be navigated only by the lawyer-
discussion of the legal identity, see Elkins, supra note 42.
125. The New Public Interest Lawyers, supra note 121, at 1137-38.
126. Id. at 1145.
127. Id. at 1072. The compromise between personal values and social concerns is analo-
gous to a problem presented by Ralf Dahrendorf: that of a leader immersing himself in an
organization. Dahrendorf uses the metaphor of atmospheric re-entry from space travel:
It is the problem of the exact angle at which they dive into the thicker atmosphere of
the organization while remaining intact and alive themselves. If the angle is too steep,
the leader burns up in the organization, becomes a part of it, adopts its mores and fails
to have an impact; the bureaucratization of leadership. If, on the other hand, the angle
is too flat, the space capsule may be thrown back into space, the leader never actually
penetrates the organization but remains an isolated figure head again without impact,
brilliant perhaps, ineffectual certainly; leadership without relevance.
R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 107 at 40.
128. The cultivation of emotional and moral sensitivities, along with intellectual
development, is the mark of thorough professional preparation for the lawyer. Without
the cultivation of self-consciousness, and people-consciousness, as well as law con-
sciousness, preparation for the practice of law becomes sterile and, inevitable, the
practice itself tends to become sterile. Lawyers are often insensitive to the society they
purport to serve. (Could it be, even that personal injustice is perpetrated by law and
lawyers where these sensing mechanisms are not developed? Maybe lawyers do not
appreciate as well as they should where personal injustice exists and how best to deal
with it.)
Redmount & Shaffer, Learning the Law - Thoughts Toward a Human Perspective, 51 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 956, 959 (1976).
The work of the artist is not unrelated to that of the public interest lawyer. The artist
operates on that which emerges from indirect consciousness to express a larger social reality.
Gary Snyder, the poet and essayist, has defined poetry, for example, as "the skilled and
inspired use of the voice and language to embody rare and powerful states of mind that are
in immediate origin personal to the singer, but at deep levels common to all who listen." G.
SNYDER, EARTH HoUSE HOLD 117 (1969).
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artisan.'29 Karl Llewellyn warned that "[n]o discipline is healthy
in which the practical-arts side is not in steady interplay with the
theoretical: providing problems, providing experience and insight,
testing, and retesting theory."'3 0 Llewellyn was quick to point out
that "technical competence without ideals is a menace and ideals
without technique a mess."''
"[To show what is not a mess, but a salvation, one needs to
put technique to work upon ideals, and with vision."'32 It is only an
artist who can couple the passion of idealism within the context of
the problem-solving world of the lawyer.'33 The failure to adopt a
more visionary stance may result in the "obsolescence of lawyers.' 34
129. Paul Freund has noted that "the basic dilemmas of art and law are, in the end,
not dissimilar, and in their resolution - the resolution of passion and pattern, of frenzy and
form, of convention and revolt, of order and spontaneity - lies the due to creativity that will
endure." P. FrEUND, supra note 16, at 23. "[Ihe good work, the most effective work of the
lawyer in practice roots in and depends on vision, range, depth, balance, and rich humanity
.... " LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 376.
130. Id. at 367-68.
131. Id. at 320-21.
132. LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 321.
133. How can one accept the problematic nature of life and law, the real and the ideal,
without being defeated by it or withdrawing and isolating oneself from the chaos of the
paradox? One way to approach the paradoxical is to maintain a sense of wonder and open
oneself to the serendipitous nature of the legal experience. Serendipity is the faculty of
making fortunate and unexpected discoveries by accident. The paradoxical can be ap-
proached only through a "child-like sense of wonder." "Wonder" here is used to connote the
impending sense of the unknown (the unknown substance of the law and our future role as
lawyers), or playfulness. See S. KEEN, supra note 79.
134. See Miller, Public Law and the Obsolescence of the Lawyer, 19 U. FLA. L. Rv.
574 (1966-67).
Judge Learned Hand has warned us of the perils of becoming administrative bureaucrats.
"The lawyer must either learn to live more capaciously or be content to find himself continu-
ously less trusted, more circumscribed, till he becomes hardly more important than a minor
administrator, confined to a monotonous sound of record and routine, without dignity, inspi-
ration, or respect." THE SPIRr OF LiRmrY: PAS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNm HAND 19 (I.
Dilliard ed. 1952).
Miller, supra at 515-19, suggests that:
[Tihe hypothesis is tenatively advanced that the legal profession as a whole has not
kept pace with a rapidly altering society and, hence, must learn new skills and new
ways of thinking or stand in danger of being bypassed. The American people will not
long tolerate any institution or any profession which does not fulfill its deepest aspira-
tions and desires. It is by no means clear that Americans today are receiving what they
should from lawyers. To the extent that they are not, a real tragedy and possible danger
exists, for law is too important - much too important - not to be seen as central in
a nation such as the United States. But the law that is studied in the law schools and
much of what appears in the writings of lawyers bears little relevance to the "real"
world.
[ ..i he lawyer - whether professional or mere technician - may well plum-
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met in social importance unless he adapts himself to changing reality and to the
demands and deepest aspirations of the American people. There is little evidence that
such an adaption is taking place. While this does not mean that lawyers will disappear
or even become obsolete, it does mean that they may well become less relevant to the
world at large and thus obsolescent. No doubt they will still be around, perhaps in large
numbers, but merely as practitioners "in a rather esoteric craft of limited social value."
Many years ago the prescient Holmes could call the lawyer of the future, not the black-
letter man, but the expert in economics and statistics. The Holmesian future is here,
but the black-letter men still predominate. In an age when public law is all pervasive,
they still are private-law oriented; in the era of the "administrative state," they still
think courts are central; in a Darwinian and Einsteinian age, they still adhere to
Ptolemy and Newton; in a time when Freud and successors have revolutionized the
conception of the human mind, they still cling tightly to the ideas of the Age of
Enlightenment. Law may be "conservative" - it is of necessity a conserving influence
- but there is no requirement that it be blind.
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